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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE.
CHESTER G. VERNIER AND ELMER A. WILcox.
APPEAL.
Barks v. State, Okla., Cr. App., 147 Pac. 1055. Failure to perfect in time. By
statute an appeal from a conviction of felony must be taken within six months after
the rendition of judgment. Defendant was convicted of felony and judgment
entered. The six-months period expired on November 21st. On November 19th,
defendant's attorney delivered the petition in error, with a copy of case-made thereto
attached, in duplicate, to an Express Company, properly directed. The petition
and case-made should have been delivered to the Clerk of the Appellate Court on
November 20th. Through some mistake made by the Express Company, the papers
were not delivered until November 22nd. The Attorney General moved to dismiss
the appeal because the papers were not filed in time. Held, that the "plaintiff
in error at his peril takes the chances of delay by forwarding the record by express."
The appeal was dismissed and the case remanded with directions to carry the judg-
ment into execution.
BURGLARY.
State v. Hodgdon, 94 Atlantic, 301. Vermont. Intent. Under P. S. 5751,
defining burglary as a nighttime breaking and entering of the dwelling house, etc.,
with an intent to commit larceny or other felony, a breaking and entry is burglarious
if done with intent to commit larceny, whether the larcbny done or intended is petty
or grand larceny, although petty larceny is not a statutory felony.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Guinn v. U. S., 35 Supreme Court Reports, 926. Validity of the Grandfather
Clause. The exemption from the literacy test prescribed by the 1910 amendment
of the Oklahoma Constitution, Article 3, Section 4a, as a condition to voting, which
that amendment makes in favor of persons, who, on January 1, 1866, or at any date
prior thereto, were entitled to vote under any form of government, or who, at that
time, resided in some foreign nation, and his lineal descendants, is a denial or abridg-
ment of the right to vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude,
contrary to the United States Constitution, 15th amendment, as it creates a standard
which, as a necessary result, recreates and perpetuates the very conditions which
the 15th amendment was intended to, destroy.
And the invalidity of this exemption renders invalid the literacy test itself.
State v. Sawyer, 94 Atl. 886 Me. Validity of United States Migratory Bird
Game Law. The commerce clause of the Constitution, giving Congress the right
to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several states, and with the
Indian tribes, does not warrant act of Congress of March 4, 1913, purporting to
regulate the killing and taking of migratory and insectivorous birds within the
several states; the killing or taking of such birds not being acts of commerce.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS 603
Nor does the general welfare clause, declaring that Congress shall have the power
to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory
or other property belonging to the United States, for wild game is not property
belonging to the federal government.
CoNsTITuTIoNAL LAW.
Arrowsmith v. State, Tenn., 175 S. W. 545. Right to a speedy trial. Eleven
indictments were found against the defendant. He was tried and convicted on one,
and sentenced to three years in the penitentiary. The other cases were continued
by consent to the January term. At the January term they were continued to the
next term, not at the instance of the accused. At the next term, on the suggestion
of the Attorney General that the defendant was serving a term in the penitentiary,
the cases were "retired from the docket until the expiration bf said sentence."
After the expiration of the sentence the prosecuting attorney moved to reinstate
four of the untried cases. The defendant objected, assigning as one ground that
the case had been delayed, thus denying him a speedy and public trial as
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States and of the State, and by
the State statute. The court sustained the motion, restored the cases and defend-
ant was tried and convicted in one of them. He appealed. Held, that one "under
conviction and while imprisoned in the pentitentiary may be brought to the bar
for trial and sentence for another crime, whether charged to have been committed
before or during such imprisonment. * * * * The right of the State to
prosecute him is not abridged or delayed by the fact that the accused is in such
confinement, and by parity of reasoning his rights to be tried and to speedy trial
are not deferred until his period of sentence has been served or terminated." The
accused was entitled to be released "from the harrassment of a criminal prosecution
and the anxiety attending the same; * * * * A long delay may result in
the loss of witnesses for the accused * * * While imprisoned he is less able
to keep posted as to the movements of his witnesses." As the trial court, without
the consent or knowledge of the defendant or his counsel, continued the cases for
approximately two years, needlessly and vexatiously, the accused was thereby
denied the speedy trial contemplated in the constitutional provision. The con-
viction was reversed and the defendant ordered released from custody.
DISORDERLY HousE.
Tenement House Department of the City of New York v. McDevitt, 109 N. E. 88,
N. Y. Validity of Tenement House Law. The Tenement House Law, as amended
by the laws of 1913, Chapt. 598, forbidding the use of any part of a tenement for the
purpose of prostitution, though construed to inflict a penalty independently of the
knowledge of the owner as to the use, is a valid act.
ENTRAFMENT.
Quey v. U. S., 22 Fed. 766. Consent of government officer. It is no defense to
a prosecution for conspiracy to receive opium imported contrary to law that the
opium was taken ashore by a steward, not one of th6 defendants, with the permis-
sion of the United States officers, given for the purpose of detecting the criminals.
ERROR WAIVED BY FAILURE TO OBJECT.
State v. Baker, Mo., 175 S. W. 64. Misconduct of prosecuting attorneys. "Much
stress is laid by defendant upon the alleged misconduct of special counsel for the
prosecution, from the superabundance of which and the overzeal of whom the record
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seriously suffers. This is always the case when special hired counsel for the state
assist the prosecuting attorney in a state case. The overzeal of dollars always
outruns the zeal of duty, and the record resulting, as a rule, bristles with error.
This record is no exception. It is filled with things which utterly disregard the
rights of defendant, and which were clearly begotten of a desire of hired counsel
to richly earn their fees. But these erroneous matters were not objected to, or
excepted to, and thus saved for our review. This condition applies as well to the
offering of testimony, much of which was utterly inadmissible, as it does to the
language of hired counsel, which was reprehensible in the extreme. But to this
language of counsel for the state no objection was made by defendant, nor did the
learned trial court rule, nor was he asked to rule, nor was any objection or exception
made or saved to his lack of action in failing to rule. In this state of the case we
ought not to convict the trial court of error. Defendant simply "excepted" to the
remarks of counsel. He did not ask the trial judge either to rebuke or further rebuke
counsel or fine them or put them in jail, some one of which the trial judge might
have done if he had been asked. It is sufficient ordinarily to except simply to the
erroneous things which the trial court himself does; but it is ordinarily necessary,
first, to object to the erroueous things which the opposing side does, and then
except when the court refuses to afford relief upon the objection made."
EVIDENCE.
People v. Roach, 109 N. E. 618, N. Y. Expert evidence as to finger prints. In a
prosecution for murder, where there was testimony of five separate marks upon the
clapboards of the deceased's house, and proof that such marks were made in human
blood, the expert testimony of witness who fully explained his qualifications, speci-
fied the circumstances upon which he predicated his opinion, swore that he was able
to express an opinion with reasonable certainty, and who was exhaustively and
skillfully cross examined as to the identity of finger prints upon paper with the
marks upon the clapboards, was competent.
People v. Becker, 109 N. E. 127, N. Y. Dying declarations. The declaration
of one convicted of murder, made just before execution, that defendant, on trial as
instigator of murder, had nothing to do with it as far as he knew, is inadmissible.
State v. Murphy, 94 Atlantic 640, N. J. Admissibility of confession. A trial
judge is justified in admitting in evidence the confession of a criminal defendant,
notwithstanding that the friends and family of the accused were denied admission
to the jail until after the confession was made, there being no statute or rule of law
which provides that a confession shall not be taken from a prisoner until after he
shall have been advised either by friends or relatives.
The provision of the New Jersey constitution, guaranteeing a defendant the
assistance of counsel in his defense, cannot be construed to mean that one accused
of crime shall have the benefit of counsel to advise him as to whether he shall confess.
FORMER JEOPARDY.
Morgan, Warden of the United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth v. Devine, 35
Supreme Court Reporter 712. Identity of offenses. The conviction and sentence
as for two distinct offenses, of persons who steal postage stamps and postal funds
from a post office of the United States, having first burglariously entered the post
office with intent to commit a larceny therein, does not put them twice in jeopardy
within the meaning of the United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment, since the
offense, though committed in the same transaction, are made separate and dis-
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tinct by the provisions of the United States penal code, Section 190, making it a
criminal offense to steal any mail bag or other property belonging to the post office
department, and of Section 192, declaring that whoever shall break forcibly into,
or attempt to break into, any post office with the intent to commit therein any
larceny or depredation, shall be punished by fine and imprisonment.
HARmLESs ERRoR.
People v. Hunt, Cal. App., 147 Pac. 476. Erroneous instructions cured by undis-
puted proof of guilt. An osteopathic physician, who was not authorized to perform
major operations, did perform such an operation in a case in which thp parties had
been unable to secure the attendance of a regular surgeon. The patient died. The
physician was convicted of manslaughter. In charging the jury the trial judge failed
to inform them that "if the defendant believed, and as a reasonable person, under
the circumstances of the case as presented to him at the time, had reasonable cause
to believe, that the attempted operation was necessary to save the life of the de-
ceased, and that if, acting upon such belief, he attempted to perform the operation
in question, and acted with due caution and circumspection, in so doing he would
not be guilty of manslaughter, and that whatever reasonable doubt the jury might
have upon this subject they were to resolve in favor of the defendant." He did tell
them that "the defendant was not, as an osteopathic practitioner, licensed to perform
major operations, and that if he did attempt to perform such an operation upon the
deceased, as the result of which her death occurred, he would be guilty of man-
slaughter." Held, that the instructions were erroneous in both of these respects,
and that the defendant would have been entitled to a reversal, if he had asked for
a proper instruction, and there had been any evidence tending to show that he
acted with due caution in the performance of the operation. But all of the instruc-
tions upon this point requested by the defendant were defective, and were properly
refused by the court. There was no evidence which would have justified the jury
in finding that the defendant acted with due care or in entertaining a reasonable
doubt whether he had not exercised such care; "on the contrary, the evidence
affirmatively and indisputably shows that the defendant, in his attempted perform-
ance of the operation in question, acted with a shocking degree of unskillfulness,
evincing an almost incredible ignorance of surgery and anatomy, and utterly wanting
in those elements of skill, caution, and circumspection which the law requires and
which should invariably attend upon such an operation. These being the undis-
puted facts and uncontradicted proofs in the case, the errors of the court in giving
the instructions to which the defendant has objected become immaterial, as does
also the failure of the court, if the same be error, to have amended and then given
instructions covering the points ineffectively presented in the requested instructions
of the defendant; and this for the reason that in any event it would have been the
duty of the jury to have found the defendant guilty of manslaughter, and for the
jury to have failed to have performed this duty in this case would have clearly
amounted to a miscarriage of justice." The conviction was affirmed.
IMPEACHING VERDICT.
State v. Dreiling, Kan., 147 Pac. 1108. Taking defendant's failure to testify
into consideration. A Kansas statute forbids jurors to consider the fact that the
defendant in a criminal action has failed to take the witness stand in his own behalf.
After a conviction, on a motion for a new trial, the defendant produced the affidav-
its of two jurors to the effect that, in the jury room, reference was made to the
failure of defendant to testify and that they considered that in dgreeing to the con-
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viction. Two other jurors testified that they had no recollection that any such
statements were made, and that they did not hear the subject discussed by the
jurors. The trial court, in the opinion denying a new trial, said "it does not believe
the testimony of those two jurors who ay they considered that* * * * The
court * * * * does not believe that they willfully disregarded the instruc-
tions. • * * * No matter what they say about it now." Held, that while
a juror "may testify to facts that transpired in the jury room;" he "cannot impeach
his verdict by an affidavit or testimony to the effect that he considered this or con-
sidered that, or by attempting to relate the working of his mind or the mental process
by which he arrived at an agreement to the verdict." As the trial court disbelieved
the testimony of the jurors, it was authorized to deny a new trial. The judgment
was affirmed.
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE.
Stephens v. Commonwealth, Ky., 175 S. W. 353. Maximum and minimum
sentence. Under the indeterminate sentence law of Kentucky the jury are required
in their verdict to state the minimum and maximum limits of the term of imprison-
ment to be imposed upon the defendant, which must be within the limits prescribed
by law for the punishment of the offense. A jury convicted the defendant of larceny
"and fix his punishment at not less than one year and not more than one year in the
state penitentiary." Thereupon the court sentenced defendant to the penitentiary
for a period of not less than one year nor more than two years. - Held, that the
punishment thus fixed is not "indeterminate" or "for an indefinate term." The
verdict does not conform either to the letter or spirit of the indeterminate sentence
law. The trial court was without authority to extend the punishment fixed by the
verdict. The court should have refused to receive the verdict, and instructed the
jury to retire and agree; if they could, upon a verdict and put it in proper form.'
The judgment was reversed.
In an earlier decision, Harris v. Commonwealth, 174 S. W. 476, noted in the
September JOURNAL on page 435, the same court affirmed a conviction based upon
a sentense of not less than one year nor more than one year and one day.
INSTRUCTIONS.
People v. Rees, 109 N. E. 473, Illinois. Promise of Immunity. Where an
accomplice, whq testified for the state, had been promised immunity from prose-
cution, and two other witnesses for the state, who were not implicated in the particu-
lar crime had been promised immunity from prosecution for criminal offenses, and
one of the latter felt resentment against one of the defendants, for procuring his
indictment, it was error to refuse an instruction, requested by defendants, that the
jury should consider whether any witness had become interested or hoped to receive
any reward, immunity or benefit, or had his feelings or passions enlisted against
the defendants, and if they so found, whether the testimony of the witness on the
material facts was thereby affected.
MISCONDUCT OF JURY.
State v. Coleman, Mo., 175 S. W. 209. Evidence df Eavesdropper. The defend-
ant was convicted of murder. In support of a motion for a new trial, he introduced
an affidavit that the jury in discussing the case in the jury room, took into consider-
ation matters known to them, as to which no evidence had been introduced.on the
trial, namely the defendant's habits as to drinking, and the fact that another jury
had acquitted the defendant in another trial for murder at the same term of court,
and they would be subjeqt to public criticism if the acquitted this defendant. The
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State did not introduce any affidavit of the jurors to deny this statement, but put
the man who had made the affidavit for defendant upon the stand. He testified
that when he heard what occurred in the jury room, he was standing by the door
listening. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial and the defendant
appealed. Held, that the trial court doubtless considered the witness, inasmuch
as he was an eavesdropper, not to be a disinterested witness, and therefore did
not consider his affidavit sufficient to overthrow the presumption in favor of the
right conduct of the jury. The court properly considered that presumption, as
against the evidence, and was justified in denying the motion. The conviction was
affirmed.
State v. Tilden, Idaho, 147 Pac. 1056. Reading newspapers. The defendant
was convicted of manslaughter. One ground for a motion for a new trial was mis-
conduct on the part of the jury. This was supported by the affidavit of one of
defendant's attorneys to the effect that at the request of a juror the trial court
allowed members of the jury to procure magazines or other reading material, pro-
vided that any reports concerning the pending trial should be cut from daily news-
papers supplied to them and that the members of the jury should not read any such
report. That the affiant has been informed and believes that newspapers contain-
ing what purported to be a dying declaration of the man who was killed by the
defendant were given to the jury and that members of the juryread these reports
during the progress of the trial, and were thereby biased and prejudiced against
the defendant. An affidavit of one of the jurors was filed stating that the bailiff
permitted the jury to have and to read copies of the newspapers which contained
these reports. The State contended that the affidavits did not show that any
juror read the objectionable articles or were influenced thereby; nor that the articles
were not cut from the papers. Held, as it would be difficult for the defendant to
prove a violation of the court's order, and easy for the prosecution to prove com-
pliance; the burden of proof was on the State. Failure to introduce affidavits of
members of the jury that they had not read the articles, raises a strong presumption
that they did. There was no evidence of such dying declaration properly intro-
duced. The jurors were likely to be influenced by the newspaper reports. Hence
the judgment of conviction should be arrested and a new trial granted.
NEw TRiAL.
Nichols v. Flannigan, Mich., 152 N. W. 482. No power to grant at Common Law.
A statute provided that in a criminal case a new trial might be granted "at the
same term or at the next term thereafter." The defendants who had been con-
victed in a criminal prosecution, moved for a new trial, which was denied. Within
the period fixed by statute, they renewed their motion. There was a hearing on
this motion, and the matter was taken under advisement. After the expiration of
the statutory period, the defendants filed an amendment to their motion for a new
trial, adding another ground. This was done with the express consent, in open court,
of the prosecuting attorney, and he waived any objection to the granting of the
motion. There was a hearing upon the motion as amended, and the court denied
the motion in so far as it was based upon the original grounds, but granted it upon
the ground set out in the amendment. Mandamus proceedings were then brought
to compel the Judge to vacate the order for a new trial and to compel him to remand
the defendants to serve the remainder of their sentences. It was held that at com-
mon law there was no power to grant a new trial in a criminal case, the only relief
in case of an improper conviction being by recommendation for pardon. The
statute granting the power having limited the period during which it could be exer-
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cised, at the expiration'of that period the court lost jurisdiction over the case. The
consent of the prosecuting attorney could not give jurisdiction. Consequently
the action upon the amendment, "which was in fact a new motion," was invalid.
Mandamus issued, vacating the order for a new trail and directing that the prisoners
be remanded, to be dealt with in accordance with the original sentence.
PAROLE.
Duehay et al v. Thompson, 223 Fed. 305. Effect of commutation of sentence.
The Act of January 23, Chapt. 9, provides that every convict imprisoned for a defin-
ite term,' whose record shows that he has observed the rules of the institution and
who has served one-third of the total of the term for which he was sentenced, may
be released on parole. Act of June 25, 1910, Chapt. 387, a part of the original act
relative to paroles provides that nothing herein shall impair the power of the Presi-
dent to grant a pardon or commutation. Held that, where the President commutes
a prisoner's term of imprisonment from eight to four years, the prisoner was eligible
to parole when he had served one-third of the computed sentence of four years, as
a commutation of sentence or punishment is a change from a higher to a lower
punishment, or the substitution of a less for a greater punishment, and the commu-
tation did not substitute a sentence by the President for the judgment of the court,
but left the judgment of the court in force, though in a modified form. (Ross, J.,
dissenting.)
PLEA.
Ex parte Super. Tex. Cr. App., 175 S. W. 697. Made by defendant's mother.
Under the Constitution and statutes of Texas, a defendant who is charged with
a misdemeanor may appear in person or by counsel, and a plea of guilty may be en-
tered through his counsel. Super was charged, in a Justice court, with a mis-
demeanor. His mother, who was not an attorney, and had no authority to do so,
entered a plea of guilty. The Justice gave judgment on this plea and issued a
commitment under which Super was arrested. He applied for a writ of habeas
corpus. Held, that the statute gave no authoriiy to the relator's mother to enter
the plea, hence there had been no legal conviction and a commitment could not be
lawfully issued. The relator was discharged.
PRIvATE DETECTIVES.
Koscak v. State, Wis., 152 N. W. 181. Crime instigated by. Defendant was
seriously injured while at work for a corporation. He was thereafter employed by
•the company at light work for about three years, when he was discharged. He tried
to get reinstated without success, and wrote to an officer of the company a letter
containing vague threats. The officer sent for him and he demanded either per-
manent employment or pay for his injury. He was re-employed, and private
detectives were hired to watch him. One of these reported that he was dangerous,
but testified at the trial that this report was false. There was evidence, which was
denied by the officers of the company and of the detective agency, that there was
a plan to entice the defendant upon the premises of the'manager of the company,
and to shoot him when he was there, but no attempt was made to put this plan
into execution. A detective, ostensibly employed as a workman by the company,
failed in an attempt to get defendant to join with him in stealing the company's
property, the object being to have the defendant imprisoned. Soon after this
failure, the detective was discharged as a workman, and the next day the defendant
was discharged.jThe detective pretended to be the defendant's friend, promised
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to aid him in getting revenge, and proposed to dynamite the manager's house.
Another detective purported to enter the plot as an accomplice. He posed as a
desperate man, and intimidated defendant by displaying a revolver. In further-
ance of the plan to blow up the manager's house, the defendant and one of the de-
tectives went to another town where the defendant ordered dynamite. The next
day defendant went alone, got it and took it home. It was agreed that he should
keep it till night when the detectives were to get it, and blow up the house. That
evening he was arrested. He had done nothing to prevent the detectives from
carrying out the proposed plot, but explained this by saying they had threatened
to kill him if he told.
At the trial, the court charged the jury that it was no defense for the defendant
that the detectives did not have any intent to use the dynamite for any unlawful
purpose. It refused to instruct them that the defendant was not guilty "if he
bought the dynamite and had it in his possession, not because of a desire and intent
that it be so used, but because he was induced by threats and intimidation to buy,
transport and possess it."
The defendant was convicted of the statutory crime of buying, transporting
and having in his possession dynamite, with the intent that it should be used for the
destruction of property or the murder of any person, or knowing that it was intended
by other persons for such pur~oses. He was sentenced to five years in the peni-
tentiary, and appealed. Held, that as the detectives had no intent to destroy
property or to murder the manager, the defendant was not guilty of buying, trans-
porting and having in his possession dynamite, knowing that it was intended to be
used by others unlawfully. But under the instructions the jury may have con-
victed him of that offense. It was further held that it was error not to give an
instruction that "if the detectives promoted, urged, or originated the perpetration
of these offenses," or "intimidated defendant and thereby became the active parties
to instigate and perpetrate the offense charged," and "defendant under the facts
and circumstances of the case was only a passive participant in the crime charged,
then he was not guilty." The argument in support of this latter ruling was that
the officer and manager who employed the detectives were bound by their acts in
originating and carrying out the perpetration of the offense. "It is safer law and
sounder morals to hold, where one arranges to have a crime committed against
his property or himself, and knows that an attempt is to be made to encourage
others to commit the act by one acting in concert with such owner, that no crime
is thus committed. The owner and his agent may wait passively for the would-be
criminal to perpetrate the offense, and each and every part of it, for himself, but
they must not aid, encourage, or solicit him that they seek to punish."
The conviction was reversed and the case remanded for new trial.
SENTENCE.
Mathews v. Swatts, Ga. App., 84 S. E. 980. Not modified by oral statements.
One Donald was convicted of two offenses. In imposing sentence, the judge stated
in open court that he would be relieved of the sentences upon the payment of $37.50
for each of the offenses. By mistake the clerk of the court made the fine in each
case $50.00 in entering the judgment, and the trial judge signed it as entered.
Donald served the first sentence and paid the $37.50 in full payment of the fine
imposed by the second sentence. The warden refused to release him, and habeas
corpus proceedings were brought to secure his discharge. The trial judge ordered
him to be discharged. Held on appeal, that "oral announcements of a judge are
no part of his judgment in a case. * * * * A trial judge cannot amend or
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modify a sentence after it has been duly entered up and signed by him, and the term
of court has passed. * - * * * A judgment of a court of record can only be
shown by its records." The evidence that Donald was to be released upon payment
of $37.50 should not have been received. To discharge Donald would clearly
remit a penalty, and usurp the executive power vested in the Governor alone.
Hence the judgment was reversed, and the writ quashed.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
Berklgy v. Commonwealth, Ky., 175 S. W. 364. Continuous prosecution. A
Kentucky statute provides that if a demurrer be sustained to an indictment, the
matter may be referred to another grand jury, and the defendant held in custody.
An indictment was found against defendant before the expiration of the period
fixed by the statute of limitations. After that time had expired a demurrer to the
indictment was sustained and the indictment dismissed, with leave to resubmit
to the grand jury. A few days later a new indictment was found, upon which the
defendant was tried and convicted. He objected that the prosecution was barred
by the statute of limitations. Held, that the prosecution was continuous and dated
from the time the first indictment was returned. Hence the prosecution was not
barred by limitation. The judgment was affirmed.
SUSPENDED SENTENCE.
Ex parte Lawson, Tex. Cr. App., 175 S. W. 698. Setting aside the suspension.
The relator was convicted of felony, and on the recommendation of the jury, the
sentence was suspended during good behavior. Later she was convicted of three
other felonies, filed a motion for a new trial in each case, and appealed from the orders
denying her motion. Pending the appeal, the trial court cited the relator to show
cause why the order suspending the sentence on the first conviction should not be
set aside. The relator showed for cause that the last three judgments %tere not
final judgments, because she had perfected an appeal in each of the cases. The
trial court set aside the suspension and refused to permit the relator to appeal from
its order. The relator sued out a writ of habes corpus. Held, that the trial court
had no authority to set aside the suspension of the sentence until the judgment
in one of the subsequent prosecutions had become final by judgment or affirmance
of the Supreme Court. As the record shows that the court did not have authority
to set aside the suspension, and the court improperly denied the relator the right to
appeal from its order, habeas corpus would properly lie to relieve the defendant
from imprisonment under the order. Judgment was reversed and the relator
discharged from imprisonment.
TRAL.-
Commonwealth v. Filer, 94 Atl. 822 Pa. Conduct of jury. That the jury in
a homicide case, while taking a walk in the custody of an'officer, viewed in the
absence of defendant and his counsel a location mentioned by defendant in his
testimony, did not require a new trial, where it did not appear that defendant was
prejudiced thereby.
